

1		Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein	
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9	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON		
10	AT SEAT	TLE	
11	STATE OF WASHINGTON,		
12	Plaintiff,	Case No. 2:19-cv-1502-BJR	
13		BRIEF OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AS AMICUS	
1415	V.	CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF	
16	DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, <i>et al.</i> ,	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	
17	Defendants.		
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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. House of Representatives (House) submits this amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The House has a compelling institutional interest in this suit, which seeks to enjoin the Administration from spending federal funds without a valid Congressional appropriation and, indeed, in defiance of a clear Congressional refusal to appropriate funds in excess of \$1.35 billion for a border wall.¹

The Appropriations Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, vests Congress with "exclusive power over the federal purse," and is "one of the most important authorities allocated to Congress in the Constitution's 'necessary partition of power among the several departments." *U.S. Dep't of the Navy v. FLRA*, 665 F.3d 1339, 1346-47 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting *The Federalist No. 51*, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).

Notwithstanding this bedrock constitutional principle, the Administration seeks to invoke inapposite general appropriations authorities to circumvent Congress's rejection of President Trump's demand for \$5 billion for a border wall. To this point, President Trump recently declared, "We're taking money from all over because as you know the Democrats don't want us to build the wall."²

Specifically, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment concerns the Administration's reprogramming of \$3.6 billion from Department of Defense (DOD) military construction projects to border wall construction under 10 U.S.C. § 2808. As demonstrated below and in plaintiff's filings, the Administration's invocation of Section 2808 in defense of its unconstitutional spending on the border wall is invalid.³ Section 2808 does not authorize spending that Congress has

¹ No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amicus curiae and its counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

² The White House, *A Message from President Trump on the Border Wall*, YouTube (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0fEdhud7RJI.

³ The House fully supports plaintiff's request for summary judgment in this case. The House has focused this brief on the Appropriations Clause issues of greatest concern to the House and does not address all of the arguments raised by plaintiff.

deliberately refused to provide. And, in any event, Section 2808 only authorizes the reprogramming of military construction funds subject to specific requirements, which the Administration has not met here.

This Court should grant summary judgment to plaintiff on its claims regarding expenditures the Administration purports to make under Section 2808 and should forbid the Administration from spending funds under Section 2808 on the construction of a border wall.

INTRODUCTION

This dispute grew directly out of a pitched battle that the President and Congress waged over the subject of this litigation: funding for a border wall. Although the President originally requested "\$1.6 billion [for fiscal year 2019] to construct approximately 65 miles of border wall," by the middle of 2018, he was "press[ing] Republicans to give him \$5 billion as a down payment on his wall." Near the end of the 115th Congress, he and Congress faced an impasse on the issue.

In December 2018, President Trump held a televised meeting with then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer to negotiate fiscal year 2019 appropriations for a border wall.⁶ During that meeting, the President reiterated his demand for \$5 billion for a border wall. He warned, "If we don't get what we want one way or the other, whether it's through you, through a military, through anything you want to call it, I will shut down the government."

⁴ Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Fiscal Year 2019: Efficient, Effective, Accountable: An American Budget: Budget of the U.S. Government 58 (2018), https://perma.cc/MD3C-62YP.

⁷ *Id*.

⁵ Rachael Bade, *Immigration Storm Bears Down on Republicans*, Politico (July 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/D8LJ-DLTK; *see also* Letter from Russell T. Vought, Acting Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Sen. Richard Shelby, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Appropriations (Jan. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/98MY-3VXF (requesting \$5.7 billion for a border wall).

⁶ Aaron Blake, *Trump's Extraordinary Oval Office Squabble with Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi, Annotated*, Wash. Post (Dec. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/2W9K-L2Z6.

Congress swiftly rebuked President Trump's decision to declare a national emergency at the southern border and spend in excess of what Congress had appropriated on the construction of a border wall. On February 26, 2019, the House adopted House Joint Resolution 46 by a vote of 245 to 182, terminating President Trump's national emergency declaration pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1622.²⁶ On March 14, 2019, the Senate passed the joint resolution by a vote of 59 to 41.²⁷ The joint resolution was supported by numerous Republicans, including Utah Senator Mitt Romney, who stated that his vote of disapproval was "a vote for the Constitution and for the balance of powers that is at its core." President Trump vetoed the joint resolution on March 15, 2019.²⁹

The Administration has since then taken various steps to advance construction of the wall, and most recently it authorized eleven border wall projects in California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas pursuant to Section 2808.³⁰ To fund these eleven projects, the Administration announced its intention to reprogram funding that Congress had appropriated for 127 other projects.³¹ One of those projects is a pier and maintenance facility in Bangor, Washington, for which Congress appropriated \$88.96 million.³²

The Secretary of Defense stated that eleven border wall projects "are necessary to support the use of the armed forces in connection with the national emergency." He asserted that the

²⁶ 165 Cong. Rec. H2217-18 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2019).

²⁷ 165 Cong. Rec. S1882 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2019).

²⁸ Marianne Levine, *Senate Deals Blow to Trump in Vote to Terminate Border Emergency*, Politico (Mar. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/Z2HX-7TZY.

²⁹ *Veto Message to the House of Representatives for H.J. Res. 46*, White House (March 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/58P4-75AE.

³⁰ See Notice of Filing of Admin. Record for Border Barrier Projects Undertaken Pursuant to 10 U.SC. § 2808 (Administrative Record) at 16-17 (Oct. 11, 2019), ECF No. 9.

³¹ *Id.* at 89.

³² *Id*.

³³ *Id*. at 9.

projects "will deter illegal entry, increase the vanishing time of those illegally crossing the border,
and channel migrants to ports of entry."34 In his view, this would "reduce the demand for DoD
personnel and assets at the locations where the barriers are constructed and allow the
redeployment of DoD personnel and assets to other high-traffic areas on the border without
barriers," allowing "DoD to provide support to [the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)]
more efficiently and effectively."35
ARGUMENT THE ADMINISTRATION'S EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS UNDER SECTION 2808 ON CONSTRUCTION OF A BORDER WALL VIOLATES THE APPROPRIATIONS CLAUSE
I. Defendants Have Violated the Appropriations Clause
Plaintiff has asserted a constitutional claim under the Appropriations Clause. As the
history recited above makes clear, Congress rejected President Trump's request for over \$5 billion
for a border wall, but the Administration nonetheless decided to build the wall "without
Congress."36 This decision violates the Appropriations Clause, which dictates that the
Administration may spend funds—including to build a border wall—only if, and to the extent that,
Congress appropriates funds for that purpose. See, e.g., Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
272, 291 (1850) ("It is a well-known constitutional provision, that no money can be taken or
drawn from the Treasury except under an appropriation by Congress.").
Having precipitated the longest government shutdown in history because Congress would
not appropriate the amount of funds it wanted for a border wall, the Administration now claims to
have found "secreted in the interstices of legislation the very grant of power which Congress
consciously withheld." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). As relevant here, the Administration relies on Section 2808. But this
$\overline{}^{34}$ Id.
³⁵ <i>Id</i> .
³⁶ Andrew O'Reilly, <i>Mulvaney Says Border Wall Will Get Built</i> , 'With or Without' Funding from Congress, Fox News (Feb. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/NGM3-2FML.

statute does not authorize spending in excess of the funds that Congress has appropriated, particularly where, as here, Congress has denied additional expenditures for a particular purpose.

II. Section 2808 Does Not Allow Defendants to Spend More on a Border Wall Than Congress Appropriated

Defendants are not authorized to spend federal funds on the construction of a border wall under Section 2808. As another court in this Circuit recognized, "[u]nder the circumstances, it is unclear how border barrier construction could reasonably constitute a 'military construction project' such that Defendants' invocation of Section 2808 would be lawful." *Sierra Club v. Trump*, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2019); *see id.* at 921 (expressing "concern[] with [the Administration's] arguments" on Section 2808 but determining at that time that plaintiffs had not shown irreparable harm because the Section 2808 construction project locations had not yet been specified).

Section 2808 provides that

[i]n the event of a declaration of war or the declaration by the President of a national emergency in accordance with the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) that requires use of the armed forces, the Secretary of Defense, without regard to any other provision of law, may undertake military construction projects, and may authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to undertake military construction projects, not otherwise authorized by law that are necessary to support such use of the armed forces. Such projects may be undertaken only within the total amount of funds that have been appropriated for military construction, including funds appropriated for family housing, that have not been obligated.

10 U.S.C. § 2808(a). Section 2808(a) thus authorizes the Secretary of Defense to redirect unobligated military construction funds to other projects, subject to three specific limitations: (1) there must be a national emergency "that requires use of the armed forces," (2) the funding must be spent on a "military construction project[]," and (3) the project must be "necessary to support [the] use of the armed forces." *Id*.

1. In order to transfer funds under Section 2808, there must be a national emergency that "requires the use of the armed forces"—not simply use of the armed forces' *money*. There is no such national emergency here.

Border security is a matter for domestic law enforcement—specifically, DHS and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). *See* 6 U.S.C. § 202. CBP is the "largest federal law enforcement agency in the United States," and its mission is to "safeguard America's borders."³⁷ Indeed, the Administration recognized this fact when it used \$601 million from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund³⁸ to construct a border wall, because money from this fund can be applied *only* to "law enforcement activities." 31 U.S.C. § 9705(g)(4)(B). Moreover, the military is expressly prohibited from making "direct active use of Federal troops" to execute domestic law under the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385. *See also United States v. Dreyer*, 804 F.3d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 2015). The Administration has made no showing that armed forces are "required" to address the described "emergency." Indeed, shortly before the national emergency proclamation, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan acknowledged that the situation at the border is "not a military threat,"³⁹ and another top-level defense official has testified that "[n]one of the capabilities that [the military is] providing [at the southern border] are combat capabilities."⁴⁰

President Trump's proclamation asserts that the situation at the border has "worsened" due to "sharp increases in the number of family units entering and seeking entry to the United States and an inability to provide detention space." But this trend has long been apparent, and the problems it causes, including humanitarian problems, are matters for domestic law enforcement, not the armed forces. And there is no argument that the circumstances at the border require even

³⁷ See, e.g., Snapshot: A Summary of CBP Facts and Figures, U.S. Customs & Border Protection (Dec. 2018), https://perma.cc/H3JS-PH9C.

³⁸ See Border Victory Fact Sheet, https://perma.cc/77SZ-GA4E.

³⁹ Department of Defense Budget Posture: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Patrick Shanahan, Acting Sec'y, Dep't of Def.) (pre-published transcript available at https://perma.cc/XX2K-J8AX).

⁴⁰ Heather Timmons, *The US Border Situation Isn't a National Emergency, Pentagon Officials Tell Congress*, Quartz (Jan. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/S4V6-VZDG.

⁴¹ National Emergency Proclamation, https://perma.cc/7SHF-Z2XL.

⁴² *See*, *e.g.*, *Southwest Border Migration FY2017*, U.S. Customs & Border Protection (Dec. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/8GW5-FD3K.

the use of DOD *money* (as distinct from armed forces personnel): the President has stated that the Democrats appropriated for border security "so much money, we don't know what to do with it."⁴³

In sum, the purported emergency here—a surge in illegal immigration—does not "require[] the use of the armed forces." 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a). It requires, if anything, enhanced domestic law enforcement. As President Trump admits, Congress has appropriated a "crazy" amount of money for this purpose. Congress has simply chosen to allocate most of that money to border security activities that do not include construction of a border wall. The Administration cannot plausibly claim that the armed forces are nevertheless "required" so that DOD can build a wall that Congress deemed unnecessary.

2. In any event, a border wall is not a "military construction project" as defined by statute. Section 2801(a) defines "military construction" as "any construction, development, conversion, or extension of any kind carried out with respect to a military installation, whether to satisfy temporary or permanent requirements, or any acquisition of land or construction of a defense access road (as described in section 210 of title 23)." A "military installation," in turn, is "a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department." 10 U.S.C. § 2801(c)(4); see id. § 2801(b) ("A military construction project includes all military construction work … necessary to produce a complete and usable facility or a complete and usable improvement to an existing facility[.]").

The Administration's border wall projects do not constitute "military construction" because, with the exception of two projects on the Barry M. Goldwater Range, the border wall projects are not being "carried out with respect to a military installation." Simply put, the southern border is not a militarized zone. It is the responsibility of DHS and CBP to ensure border security, not DOD. *See supra* at 9. Indeed, the Administration has previously invoked Section 8005 of the 2019 Department of Defense Appropriations Act as a source of transfer authority to transfer DOD funds for purposes of other border wall projects—but that law *prohibits* transfers for

⁴³ Feb. 15 Rose Garden Remarks, https://perma.cc/5SE7-FS7F.

purposes of "military construction." See Pub. L. No. 115-245, § 8005, 132 Stat. 2981, 2999; see
also Br. of the U.S. House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Pls' Mot. for a Prelim
Inj. at 2-3, 11, Sierra Club v. Trump, No. 4:19-cv-00892 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2019), ECF No. 47.

When DOD approved the projects under Section 2808, the border land at issue here was not even under its jurisdiction, let alone a "military installation." In an attempt to circumvent this threshold failing in its Section 2808 justification, the Administration intends to transfer federal lands along the border to DOD or to have DOD acquire or condemn private land along the border and to argue that this newly acquired land should be considered a "military installation." *See* Administrative Record at 3. But even if these land acquisitions were valid, they do not transform the planned border wall construction into military construction projects. As explained, a "military installation" is defined as "a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department." 10 U.S.C. § 2801(c)(4). As another federal court has recognized, the border lands at issue here are plainly not military bases, posts, stations, yards or centers. *See Sierra Club*, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 920 ("Defendants make no attempt to characterize the U.S.-Mexico border or a border barrier as a 'base, camp, post, station, yard, [or] center.' *Nor could they*." (emphasis added)).

As that court also correctly noted, "Section 2801 likely precludes treating the southern border as an 'other activity." *Id.* "The term 'other activity' appears after a list of closely related types of discrete and traditional military locations: 'a base, camp, post, station, yard, [and] center." *Id.* at 921; *see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams*, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001) ("[W]here general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words." (quotation marks omitted)). "Had Congress intended for 'other activity' in Section 2801(c)(4) to be so broad as to transform literally any activity conducted by a Secretary of a military department into a 'military installation,' there would have been no reason to include a list of specific, discrete military locations." *Sierra Club*, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 921. As that court

explained, "[i]t is thus proper to construe 'other activity' as referring to similar discrete and traditional military locations." Id. It remains difficult to "see how the U.S.-Mexico border could fit this bill." Id. The administrative record does not suggest that troops are stationed on the land where the border wall projects will be built or that such land is otherwise in use as a military post, station, yard, or center, or other similar *military* location. Simply put, "in context and with an eye toward the overall statutory scheme, nothing demonstrates that Congress ever contemplated that 'other activity' has such an unbounded reading that it would authorize Defendants to invoke Section 2808 to build a barrier on the southern border." *Id*.

Finally, to accept the Administration's argument that "military construction projects" should include land that DOD is acquiring for the purpose of constructing a border wall and construction of that wall for use by CBP—not the military—would be to circumvent the prohibitions of Section 2808 and would not represent a good-faith reading of the statute's requirements. The House is aware of no prior use of Section 2808 funds for a construction project that will not be used by the military.⁴⁴ Using Section 2808 funds to obtain land for DOD to purportedly create new military installations to build facilities that will be used for non-military purposes is inconsistent with the intent of Section 2808, and in clear defiance of Section 2808's limitation "to construction related to a military installation"—i.e., construction on "types of discrete and traditional military locations." Sierra Club, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 920-21. This Court should not endorse the Administration's obvious attempt to circumvent the purposes of the statute.

3. A border wall is not "necessary to support [the] use of the armed forces." DHS describes its mission as "gain[ing], maintain[ing], and expand[ing] operational control of the U.S. Border between ports of entry," and views border barriers as a "critical capability[y]" to achieve

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⁴⁴ Previous projects under Section 2808 have included the construction of barracks hangers and improvements to airfield runways. See Michael J. Vassalotti & Brendan W. McGarry, Cong. Research Serv., IN11017, Military Construction Funding in the Event of a National Emergency 2 (2019), https://perma.cc/75UP-ANE3 (listing all military construction projects under Section 2808 between 2001 and 2014).

this mission.⁴⁵ Over the past year and a half, the President has ordered a few thousand troops to assist the DHS and the CBP at the border. Consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act, however, troops are limited to "support roles that relieve DHS personnel of non-law enforcement duties (e.g., logistics, planning, and intelligence analysis) or that provide monitoring and detection support (i.e., operating mobile surveillance camera units or providing aerial reconnaissance)."⁴⁶

DOD has asserted that a border wall is "necessary" to support the troops because it "will reduce the demand" for the troops at barrier locations, ⁴⁷ but this assertion falls far short of demonstrating that the border wall is necessary to support the use of the armed forces. It is, at best, an argument that a border wall will reduce the need for domestic law enforcement at the border. Put differently, the fact that the border wall will make it easier for DHS and CBP to do their jobs—and potentially reduce or change the way that DOD backup is used—does not mean that the wall is "necessary to support [the] use of the armed forces." The relationship between the wall and the "armed forces" is too indirect and attenuated to satisfy this standard of necessity.

* * *

The Administration's expenditure of Section 2808 funds defies the mandate of Congress and infringes on the Congressional power of the purse. This Court should not "stretch th[e] words [of Section 2808's three prerequisites] beyond their normal meaning" to give legal cover to the Administration's transgression. *Schneider v. Smith*, 390 U.S. 17, 27 (1968). Section 2808 is one of the scores of statutes that the President may invoke by declaring a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act. The National Emergencies Act was "not intended to grant additional authority to the President," but instead to make clear that "[t]he President can only exercise those

⁴⁵ Administrative Record at 42, 54.

⁴⁶ *Id.* at 42.

⁴⁷ *Id.* at 47.

⁴⁸ See A Guide to Federal Emergency Powers and Their Use, Brennan Ctr. (2019), https://perma.cc/3HVQ-YQAA.

1		Respectfully submitted,	
2	CARTER G. PHILLIPS	DOUGLAS N. LETTER (DC Bar No. 253492)	
3	VIRGINIA A. SEITZ JOSEPH R. GUERRA	General Counsel	
4	CHRISTOPHER A. EISWERTH	<u>/s/ Todd B. Tatelman</u> TODD B. TATELMAN (VA Bar No. 66008)	
5	SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP	Deputy General Counsel	
6	1501 K STREET N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005	MEGAN BARBERO (MA Bar No. 668854) Associate General Counsel	
7	(202) 736-8000 (telephone) (202) 736-8711 (facsimile)	JOSEPHINE MORSE (DC Bar No. 1531317) Associate General Counsel	
8	cphillips@sidley.com	ADAM A. GROGG (DC Bar No. 1552438) Assistant General Counsel	
9		OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL*	
10		U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 219 Cannon House Office Building	
11		Washington, D.C. 20515 (202) 225-9700	
12		douglas.letter@mail.house.gov	
13		Counsel for Amicus Curiae the United States House of Representatives	
14	November 1, 2019		
15	1, 2017		
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20			
21			
22	*		
23	* Attorneys for the Office of General Counsel for the U.S. House of Representatives and "any counsel specially retained by the Office of General Counsel" are "entitled, for the purpose of the U.S. House of Representatives and "any counsel specially retained by the Office of General Counsel" are "entitled, for the purpose of the U.S. House of Representatives and "any counsel specially retained by the Office of General Counsel" are "entitled, for the purpose of the U.S. House of Representatives and "any counsel specially retained by the Office of General Counsel" are "entitled, for the purpose of the U.S. House of Representatives and "any counsel specially retained by the Office of General Counsel" are "entitled, for the purpose of the U.S. House of Representatives and "any counsel" are "entitled, for the purpose of the U.S. House of Representatives are "entitled, for the purpose of the U.S. House of Representatives are "entitled, for the purpose of the U.S. House of the U.S. House of Representatives are "entitled, for the purpose of the U.S. House of the U.S. House of the U.S. House of Representatives are "entitled, for the purpose of the U.S. House of the U.S. House of Representatives are "entitled, for the U.S. House of the U.S. House of the U.S. House of Representatives are "entitled" and "entitled" are "entitled" are "entitled" and "entitled" are "entitled" and "entitled" are		
24	performing the counsel's functions, to enter an appearance in any proceeding before any court of the United States without compliance with any requirements for admission to practice before such court." 2 U.S.C. § 5571(a). The Office of General Counsel wishes to acknowledge the		
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26	assistance of law clerks Christine Coogle and Lily Hsu, students at The George Washington University Law School, and Nate King, a student at The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, in preparing this brief.		
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